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Abstract—Current blockchain technologies provide very lim-
ited interoperability. Restrictions with regards to asset transfers
and data exchange between different blockchains reduce usability
and comfort for users, and hinder novel developments within the
blockchain space.
As a first step towards cross-blockchain interoperability, we
propose the DeXTT cross-blockchain transfer protocol, which
can be used to transfer a token on any number of blockchains
simultaneously in a decentralized manner. We provide a reference
implementation using Solidity, and evaluate its performance.
We show logarithmic scalability of DeXTT with respect to the
number of participating nodes, and analyze cost requirements of
the transferred tokens.
Index Terms—Cross-blockchain interoperability, claim-first
transactions, atomicity, swaps, exchange
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains, the underlying technology of cryptocurren-
cies, have gained significant interest in both industry and
research [31]. After the feasibility of decentralized ledgers
has been demonstrated by Bitcoin [21], significant investment
into research and development related to blockchains and
cryptocurrencies was sparked. Technologies range from adding
new layers on top of existing blockchain implementations [7,
25], improvements of Bitcoin itself [19], to entirely new
blockchains [26], which provide novel concepts, such as smart
contracts [6].
The level of investment in the blockchain space is in-
dicative for the technological impact and the broad range of
potential use cases for blockchain technologies [11]. However,
despite this positive momentum, structural problems exist
within the blockchain field. Development so far is centered
on the creation of new blockchains and currencies, or altering
major blockchains like Bitcoin [28]. Furthermore, there is
substantial research on potential use cases of blockchains in
various economic, social, political, and engineering fields [11].
Nevertheless, the ways in which blockchains could potentially
interact with each other remain mostly unexplored.
The constant increase in the number of independent, uncon-
nected blockchain technologies causes significant fragmenta-
tion of the research and development field, and poses chal-
lenges for both users and developers of blockchain technolo-
gies. On the one hand, users have to choose which currency
and which blockchain to use. Choosing novel, innovative
blockchains enables users to utilize new features and take
advantage of state-of-the-art technology. However, users also
risk the loss of funds if the security of such a novel blockchain
is subsequently breached, potentially leading to a total loss of
funds [22]. Choosing mature, well-known blockchains reduces
the risk of such loss, since these blockchains are more likely
to have been analyzed in-depth [18], but novel features remain
unavailable.
On the other hand, when designing decentralized block-
chain-based applications, currently, developers must decide
which blockchain to base their application on. This can form
a substantial impedance to research and technical progress,
since individual technologies form isolated solutions, and
interoperability between blockchains is mostly not given.
We therefore aim to enable cross-blockchain interoperabil-
ity. As an overarching goal, we seek to provide means of
interaction between blockchains, including cross-blockchain
data transmission, cross-blockchain smart contract interaction,
or cross-blockchain currency transfer. As a first step to enable
such cross-blockchain interoperability, we propose a protocol
for cross-blockchain token transfers, where the transferred
token is not locked within an individual blockchain. Instead,
it can be used on any number of blockchains, and its trans-
actions are autonomously synchronized across blockchains by
the system in a decentralized manner. Our solution prevents
double spending, is resilient to the cross-blockchain proof
problem (XPP) [4], and does not need external oracles or
other means of cross-blockchain communication to function.
We provide a reference implementation using Solidity, and
evaluate its performance with regards to time and cost.
The contributions of this manuscript are as follows:
• We discuss how to use eventual consistency for cross-
blockchain token transfers by utilizing concepts such as
claim-first transactions and deterministic witnesses.
• We formally define Deterministic Cross-Blockchain To-
ken Transfers (DeXTT), a protocol which implements
eventual consistency for cross-blockchain token transfers.
• We provide a reference implementation in Solidity, pre-
senting and evaluating DeXTT.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we discuss underlying technologies, provide a
brief discussion of blockchains and transaction types, claim-
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first transactions, and witness rewards, and define notation
used throughout this work. Section III presents the transfer
protocol in detail, and Section IV provides an evaluation of our
approach. Section V gives a brief overview of related work,
and describes the relation of the work at hand to our own
former work in the field of cross-blockchain interoperability.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Our work aims at providing a protocol for cross-blockchain
asset transfers, ensuring that such transfers are performed
in a decentralized and trustworthy manner. Assets can be
represented on blockchains in various ways. Apart from na-
tive currencies (e.g., Ether on the Ethereum blockchain, or
Bitcoin on the Bitcoin blockchain), there are other types of
assets, commonly called tokens. In the recent past, various
asset types with different properties have been discussed,
such as fungibility, divisibility, and types of implementation
like the user-issued asset (UIA) and Unspent Transaction
Output (UTXO) models. We refer to our previous work for
a thorough analysis [3].
In the work at hand, we discuss a token that exists on
a given number of blockchains simultaneously, i.e., a pan-
blockchain token (denoted as PBT). PBT are not locked to a
single blockchain and can be traded using the DeXTT proto-
col, which ensured synchronization of token balances across
blockchains. We refer to the set of blockchains participating
in this protocol as an ecosystem of blockchains. According
to our protocol, a wallet Ww is holding PBT not only on
a given blockchain, but on all blockchains in the ecosystem.
Thus, a transfer from Ww to another wallet Wv is required to
be recorded on all participating blockchains, and there must
be consensus among all participating blockchains about the
balance of each wallet.
Due to the XPP [4], strict consistency between blockchains
is not possible using practical means, since any verification
of data between two blockchains would essentially require
the nodes of one blockchain to verify blocks of another
blockchain. This requires both the data and the consensus pro-
tocol to be shared across blockchains, which is not possible in
practice. Therefore, in our proposal, we relax this requirement
to eventual consistency, i.e., we accept temporary disagree-
ment with regard to balances, as we show in the following. In
practice, blockchains themselves only provide eventual consis-
tency, since there is no guarantee when data submitted to the
network will be included in a block. Therefore, using eventual
consistency for synchronizing data between blockchains is a
feasible approach.
For the purpose of this paper, we follow the assumption
that each party is generally interested in all the blockchains
in an ecosystem, and specifically, in the consistency of their
balance across all blockchains. This means that all interested
parties (i.e., wallet holders) are monitoring all blockchains in
the ecosystem, and if a party participates in the protocol on
one blockchain, it also participates on all other blockchains.
We support this assumption by defining later that any incon-
sistency in wallet balances between blockchains effectively
renders the wallet useless.
DeXTT assumes that non-zero token balances already exist
on the involved blockchains. We explicitly do not define the
economic aspect of PBT, i.e., the lifecycle of tokens. Several
minting strategies exist, and we provide an overview of such
approaches (constant supply, minting rate, etc.) in previous
work [3]. Any of these approaches is usable together with
DeXTT, since the protocol assumes that tokens already exist.
A. Cross-Blockchain Balance Consistency
As outlined before, we require eventual consistency between
blockchains participating in the proposed protocol. Since due
to the XPP, we cannot directly propagate information across
blockchains, we require an alternative way to reach consis-
tency across blockchains.
For this, we propose to achieve eventual consistency using
claim-first transactions [4]. While traditionally, blockchain
transfers disallow claiming tokens before they have been
marked as spent, we explicitly decouple the required temporal
order of SPEND → CLAIM and allow its reversal, i.e., claiming
tokens before spending them. In our case, for a certain period
of time, tokens are allowed to exist in the balance of both
the sender and the receiver (on different blockchains), namely
until the information is propagated to all blockchains. In
the presented protocol, we provide a mechanism to enforce
eventual spending of the tokens in the sender balance, as
described in Section III.
In order to ensure such eventual consistency, we rely on par-
ties observing a transfer to propagate this information across
blockchains. These parties are denominated as witnesses. A
monetary incentive is provided for any witness in order to
ensure propagation. We use part of the transferred PBT for
these witness rewards. The main challenge of this approach
is the decision which witness receives the reward. Using a
first-come-first-serve basis is not feasible, since it is possible
that on one blockchain, one witness is the first to propagate
the transfer and claim the reward, while on another blockchain,
another witness takes this place. This would lead to two differ-
ent witnesses receiving a reward on two different blockchains,
and therefore, to potentially inconsistent balances.
In this work, we address this problem by using deterministic
witnesses [5]. In short, instead of using a first-come-first-serve
reward distribution, we define a witness contest. Its duration is
fixed to a validity period, contestants (i.e., reward candidates)
can register for the contest, and the decision of who wins
the contest is made deterministically and predictably by each
blockchain at the end of the contest. In Section III, we propose
an approach for deciding the winning witness in a way that
is fair (i.e., all contestants have the same chance of winning),
while at the same time, it is purely deterministic, and—given
the assumptions discussed above—assures all blockchains
reach the same decision about assigning witness rewards.
Our approach therefore solves the problem of assigning wit-
ness rewards, which is required as an incentive for observers
of a cross-blockchain transfer to propagate this transfer infor-
mation, ensuring eventual consistency across the ecosystem of
blockchains.
B. Cryptographic Signatures and Hashes
In our approach, we make extensive use of cryptographic
signatures and hashes, which are essential for blockchains
themselves. For instance, the ECDSA algorithm [17] is used
by Ethereum for creating and verifying signatures, and is also
implemented natively and available to the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) [16]. We use Solidity, the smart contract
language of Ethereum, for the reference implementation of
DeXTT. However, we note that DeXTT is not limited to
Solidity or the EVM, and other blockchains offering signatures
and hash algorithms can very well be used. The only crucial
property required by our approach is a distribution of hash
values which is approximately uniform. KECCAK256, the hash
algorithm used by Ethereum, satisfies this requirement [12], as
does the SHA-256 algorithm used by Bitcoin [13].
C. Notations and Conventions
In the following, we use particular notations for concise
description of certain objects: We denote blockchains as C with
a subscript letter, e.g., Ca. Additionally, we denote wallets as
W with a subscript letter, e.g., Ws, Wd, or Ww. A wallet
consists of a pair of corresponding keys, out of which one is a
public key, and one is a private key. When referring to a token
transfer in general, Ws is used to denote the source (sending)
wallet,Wd is used to denote the destination (receiving) wallet,
and Ww denotes a witness as discussed in Section II-A. As
discussed in Section I and demonstrated in Table I, the balance
of a wallet is stored across all blockchains.
In this work, we use the concept of transactions to denote
actions executed on a blockchain which modify the blockchain
state. We use the expression “Ww posts the transaction TRANS
on Cc” to describe the conceptual protocol. In a scenario
where smart contracts are used, this translates to the key pair
of Ww being used to sign a call to the smart contract on
blockchain Cc, where the function trans() is invoked. For
certain transactions, we define preconditions (e.g., sufficient
balances), which can be implemented as checks within the
smart contract function. The transactions posted by wallets
can either originate from the action of a user, or be initiated
by a program (e.g., a wallet application) acting autonomously.
To denote our transactions, we use the notation as shown
in (1), where TRANS is the transaction type used (one out
of CLAIM, CONTEST, FINALIZE, VETO, and FINALIZE-VETO),
Ww is the wallet (i.e., the pair of keys) used to sign and
post the transaction, a, b, and c denote data contained in the
transaction (i.e., the arguments), and σ is the signature when
using the private key of Ww to sign the data [a, b, c]. For
brevity, we use only σ to denote a multivariate value, e.g., a
three-variate ECDSA signature.
Ww : TRANS
[
a, b, c
]
σ
(1)
TABLE I
INITIAL STATE OF THE INVOLVED BLOCKCHAINS AT t = 0
Blockchain Ca
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
Blockchain Cb
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
Blockchain Cc
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
We denote a transfer of x PBT from Ws to Wd as
Ws x−→Wd. Furthermore, we denote the PBT balance of Ww
recorded on Cc as Cc :Ww.
III. DECENTRALIZED CROSS-BLOCKCHAIN TRANSFERS
In the following, we present the DeXTT protocol, together
with an example transaction. In our example, we consider three
blockchains participating in cross-blockchain transfers, Ca, Cb,
and Cc. Note, however, that our approach is applicable to an
arbitrary number of blockchains. Furthermore, we consider
the wallets Ws, Wd, Wu, Wv , and Ww. We assume that
initially, Ws has 80 PBT, and all other wallets have a balance
of zero (see Table I). We furthermore use a fixed reward of
1 PBT for the witness propagating this transaction across the
blockchain ecosystem. Note that pro rata fees (e.g., 1% of the
transferred PBT, or an amount selected by the sender) are also
possible and the exact fee model is an economic choice. We
will discuss this in more detail in Section IV-B.
As discussed in Section II-A, claim-first transactions re-
quire all blockchains within the ecosystem to maintain and
synchronize token balances. Therefore, the initial situation is
as depicted in Table I. Balances forWu andWv are not shown,
as they will remain zero throughout the example.
A. Transfer Initiation
In the following, we assume that Ws intends to transfer
20 PBT to Wd, i.e., reduce the PBT balance of Ws by 20,
increase the PBT balance of Wd by 19 (20 reduced by 1, the
witness reward), and increase the PBT balance of a (yet to
be decided) witness wallet by 1. As stated in Section II-A,
we only require eventual consistency for this transfer, i.e., a
temporary overlap is allowed where Wd has already received
19 PBT, but the balance of Ws is still unchanged.
Therefore, Ws signs this intent, confirming that indeed,
20 PBT—minus 1 PBT of witness reward—are to be trans-
ferred to Wd. Furthermore, we define a validity period for
the transfer, which denotes the time during which the witness
selection for the transfer has to take place. In our example
scenario, this time span lasts for 1 minute, however, this time
can be set significantly shorter or longer, depending on the use
case. We provide an analysis of the impact of this parameter
in Section IV-A.
We denote the entirety of the sender’s intent using the
notation shown in (2), where [t0, t1] is the validity period, and
α denotes the signature of the entire content of the brackets
by Ws. The resulting signature itself is denoted as α. We use
the ECDSA algorithm, natively supported by the EVM, for
all signatures. However, other algorithms can also be used,
assuming that their verification is supported on all involved
blockchains. [
Ws x−→Wd, t0, t1
]
α
(2)
The data contained in (2) is transferred to the receiving
walletWd. This transfer can happen on any blockchain within
the ecosystem, or using an off-chain channel. Since all of the
data contained in (2) will be published throughout the DeXTT
transaction, this channel does not need to be secure, and we
do not specifically define any communication means. The
receiving wallet then counter-signs the data from (2) using its
respective private key, yielding the entire Proof of Intent (PoI),
as shown in (3). [
Ws x−→Wd, t0, t1, α
]
β
(3)
The PoI contains all information necessary to prove to
any blockchain (i.e., to its smart contracts and miners) that
the transfer is authorized by the sender and accepted by the
receiver. The receiver can now post this PoI using a transaction
we call CLAIM. This transaction allows the receiver to publish
the PoI in order to later claim the transferred PBT. The receiver
can post this on any blockchain within the ecosystem, and does
not need to post it on more than one blockchain. The CLAIM
transaction is defined and noted as shown in (4).
Wd : CLAIM
[
Ws x−→Wd, t0, t1, α
]
β
(4)
The preconditions for the CLAIM transaction are (i) that the
PoI is valid (i.e., that the signatures α and β are correct),
(ii) that the balance of the source wallet Ws is sufficient,
(iii) that the PoI is not expired, i.e., that its t1 has not yet
passed (t < t1), and (iv) that no PoI is known to the blockchain
on which it is posted with an overlapping validity period and
the same source wallet Ws. In other words, a wallet must
not sign an outgoing PoI while another outgoing PoI is still
pending. This is done in order to prevent a double spending
attack, where two PoIs are signed which are conflicting, i.e.,
which, if both were executed, would reduce the sender’s
balance below zero.
The purpose of the CLAIM transaction is the publishing of
the PoI, which can then be propagated across the blockchain
ecosystem as described later.
In our example, we assume that the receiver Wd posts the
CLAIM transaction (containing the PoI) on Ca as shown in (5),
where 1 and 61 mark the validity period in seconds (i.e., one
minute total validity), 0xAA is assumed to be the signature α,
and 0xBB is assumed to be the signature β. For brevity, one-
byte signatures are used for demonstration in this example.
Naturally, in reality, the signature hashes are longer (e.g., 32
bytes for KECCAK256).
Wd : CLAIM
[
Ws 20−→Wd, 1, 61, 0xAA
]
0xBB
(5)
TABLE II
STATE AFTER POI PUBLICATION AT t = 1
Blockchain Ca
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
PoI 0xAA:
Ws 20−→Wd
t1 = 61
Blockchain Cb
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
Blockchain Cc
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
The CLAIM transaction on Ca changes the blockchain state
as shown in Table II. We see that the PoI has been stored
within Ca, which is referred to by its signature α. The balances
remain unchanged on Ca because the validity period is not
yet concluded, i.e., t1 is not yet reached. Naturally, since
no information has been posted yet to Cb and Cc, these
blockchains also remain unchanged at this point.
B. Witness Contest
At this point, the information about the intended trans-
fer (the PoI) is only recorded on Ca. However, this information
must be propagated to all other blockchains as well to ensure
consistency of balances across blockchains. We use the fol-
lowing mechanism, which we refer to as the witness contest,
to ensure this consistency.
Any party observing the CLAIM transaction on Ca can
become a contestant, i.e., a candidate for receiving a reward.
In order to become a contestant, the party must propagate
the PoI across all blockchains in the ecosystem. We define
the transaction used for this as CONTEST. This transaction is
defined for any arbitrary walletWo as shown in (6), where the
new signature ω is the result of the contestant Wo signing the
PoI. This signature will later play a role in determining the
winner of the witness contest, as described in Section III-C.
Wo : CONTEST
[
Ws x−→Wd, t0, t1, α, β
]
ω
(6)
The CONTEST transaction can be posted multiple times by
various contestants during the validity period. The precondi-
tions are the same as for the CLAIM transaction, i.e., the PoI
must be valid and must not violate any other PoI’s validity
period. The only effect of the CLAIM transaction is that the PoI
itself and the contestant’s participation in the witness contest
are recorded on the respective blockchain.
In our example, we assume that Wu is the first to post a
CONTEST transaction on Cb as shown in (7), where again, 1
and 61 denote the validity period, 0xAA and 0xBB are the
PoI signatures, and 0xC2 is the signature resulting from Wu
signing the PoI. The signature values in this example are cho-
sen arbitrarily in order to demonstrate the subsequent witness
contest. Again, one-byte signatures are used for brevity.
TABLE III
STATE DURING WITNESS CONTEST AT t = 2
Blockchain Ca
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
PoI 0xAA:
Ws 20−→Wd
t1 = 61
Contestants:
Wu (0xC2)
Wv (0xC3)
Ww (0xC1)
Blockchain Cb
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
PoI 0xAA:
Ws 20−→Wd
t1 = 61
Contestants:
Wu (0xC2)
Wv (0xC3)
Ww (0xC1)
Blockchain Cc
Ws balance: 80
Wd balance: 0
Ww balance: 0
PoI 0xAA:
Ws 20−→Wd
t1 = 61
Contestants:
Wu (0xC2)
Wv (0xC3)
Ww (0xC1)
Wu : CONTEST
[
Ws 20−→Wd, 1, 61, 0xAA, 0xBB
]
0xC2
(7)
Next, we assume that the other observers Wv and Ww
become contestants by posting similar CONTEST transactions.
We assume that the resulting signature ω forWv is 0xC3, and
that the signature for Ww is 0xC1.
Wv : CONTEST
[
Ws 20−→Wd, 1, 61, 0xAA, 0xBB
]
0xC3
(8)
Ww : CONTEST
[
Ws 20−→Wd, 1, 61, 0xAA, 0xBB
]
0xC1
(9)
Transactions (7–9) are eventually posted to Ca, Cb, and Cc.
This is because every contestant participating in the contest is
interested in participating in all blockchains in the ecosystem
to maintain their own consistency.
The state resulting from the three contestants posting to Ca,
Cb, and Cc is shown in Table III. The blockchain maintains a
list of contestants together with their ω signature values.
C. Deterministic Witness Selection
After the expiration of t1, the witness contest ends, a
winning witness must be selected, and awarded the witness
reward. This is performed by the FINALIZE transaction, which
must be triggered after t1.
Conceptually, this transaction is purely time-based. It can
be triggered by the receiver, by any other party, or using
a decentralized solution like the Ethereum Alarm Clock [2].
The latter approach has the advantage of being independent
of any party’s activity. However, for simplicity, in our current
approach and the discussion below, we assume that the des-
tination wallet Wd posts the FINALIZE transaction on each
blockchain. The FINALIZE transaction is defined as shown
in (10).
FINALIZE
[
α
]
(10)
TABLE IV
FINAL STATE AFTER WITNESS CONTEST AT t > 61
Blockchain Ca
Ws balance: 60
Wd balance: 19
Ww balance: 1
Blockchain Cb
Ws balance: 60
Wd balance: 19
Ww balance: 1
Blockchain Cc
Ws balance: 60
Wd balance: 19
Ww balance: 1
The FINALIZE transaction only requires the parameter α,
identifying the PoI, because the blockchain already contains
all necessary information about the PoI. The precondition of
t1 being expired (t > t1) is necessary for the FINALIZE
transaction to avoid premature finalization.
The effect of the FINALIZE transaction is that the contest
for the PoI referred to by its signature α is concluded. This
means that the winning witness is awarded the witness reward,
which, according to Section III, is 1 PBT in our current
approach. Furthermore, the conclusion of the contest performs
the actual transfer of PBT, i.e., x PBT are deducted from the
balance of Ws, and Wd receives x−1 PBT (x reduced by the
witness reward). This action is executed on all blockchains,
since FINALIZE is posted on all blockchains.
We define the winning witness to be the contestant with the
lowest signature ω (i.e., with its value closest to zero). Since
this signature cannot be influenced by the contestants (because
it is only formed from the PoI data and the contestants’
private key), they have no way of increasing their chances
of winning a particular contest, except for creating a large
number of wallets (private keys). Such “mining for wallets”
is not a violation of our protocol and no threat to its fairness,
since doing so is computationally expensive, and therefore
creates cost on its own. There exists a break-even point of the
witness reward and the cost created by the creation of a large
number of wallets [5]. Effectively, this challenge is comparable
to mining in Proof of Work (PoW) in that resources, i.e.,
computing power, can be traded for rewards.
In our example above, the witness with the lowest ω isWw,
with ω = 0xC1. Therefore, this witness is awarded the witness
reward. The final blockchain state is shown in Table IV. The
balances of the competing contestants Wu and Wv remain
zero. The expired PoIs are no longer shown for brevity.
D. Prevention of Double Spending
A malicious sender might sign two different PoIs conflicting
with each other. For instance, a sender owning 10 PBT might
create two PoIs, transferring 8 PBT each, to two different
wallets. Executing these transfers would reduce the sender’s
balance by 16 PBT in total, resulting in −6 PBT.
In order to prevent such behavior, we introduce the VETO
transaction. The VETO transaction can be called by any party
noticing two conflicting PoIs (i.e., two PoIs with the same
source, different destinations, and overlapping validity peri-
ods). Since such PoIs are forbidden by definition, the VETO
transaction is used to penalize the sender, and to protect the
receiver from losing PBT due to inconsistent balances.
Since the VETO transaction requires incentive, we propose
to use the same technique as presented above, i.e., a contest.
Any observer of a PoI conflict can report this conflict using the
VETO transaction, and after the expiration of the veto validity
period, the observer with the lowest ω signature is assigned a
reward.
We therefore define the VETO transaction as shown in (11),
where α refers to the original PoI, which is known to the
blockchain because it has already been posted on a given
blockchain, and the remaining data Ws x
′
−→Wd′ and t′0, t′1, α′
describe the new, conflicting PoI.
Ww : VETO
[
α, Ws x
′
−→Wd′ , t′0, t′1, α′
]
ω
(11)
The VETO transaction, similar to CONTEST, is posted on all
participating blockchains. Note that multiple observers can be
expected to concurrently post VETO transactions. Therefore, it
is possible that on one blockchain, a given PoI (e.g., where
α = 0x10) is posted first, and a second PoI (e.g., where α′ =
0x20) is presented as “conflicting” by a VETO transaction,
while on another blockchain, the PoI where α = 0x20 is
posted first, and the PoI with α′ = 0x10 is posted in the VETO
transaction as “conflicting”. However, in the following, we
define a behavior for the VETO transaction that still maintains
consistency, regardless of the order of PoIs.
The preconditions for VETO are that α refers to a PoI
already known to the blockchain, that the conflicting PoI is
valid, and that the two PoIs are actually conflicting.
The effects of VETO are as follows: (i) The sender of the
conflicting PoIs loses all PBT, i.e., the balance is set to zero to
penalize such protocol-violating behavior. (ii) Any PoI which
has a non-expired validity period (i.e., every PoI where t < t1)
is canceled. This means that no FINALIZE transaction will be
permitted for this PoI, the transfer itself will therefore not
be executed, and no witness reward will be assigned. Finally,
(iii) a new contest is started, called the veto contest. The veto
contest is similar to a regular witness contest in that its purpose
is the propagation of information (in this case, the information
of conflicting PoIs).
In the following, we propose a possible implementation of
such veto contest, however, its details (i.e., the definition of
its validity period or the reward) are specifics which may be
implemented differently.
We propose to use the same reward for the veto contest as
for the regular witness contest (in our case, 1 PBT). Since
all PBT held by the sender are destroyed, and only 1 PBT is
assigned to the winner of the veto contest, all remaining PBT
are lost. Furthermore, we propose the validity period expiration
of the veto contest, tVETO, to be defined as shown in (12).
tVETO = max(t1, t
′
1) + max(t1 − t0, t′1 − t′0) (12)
The definition shown in (12) states that the veto contest
is valid until a point in time which is found by taking the
later expiration time of the conflicting PoIs (max(t1, t′1)) and
adding the longer validity period (max(t1− t0, t′1− t′0)). This
is done to ensure that sufficient time is available for the veto
contest. Again, we note that this is an implementation detail
and other approaches (e.g., a fixed period) are also possible.
The veto contest is concluded by a FINALIZE-VETO trans-
action, defined as shown in (13).
FINALIZE-VETO
[
α, α′
]
(13)
The effect of the FINALIZE-VETO transaction is similar to
that of the FINALIZE transaction, except that no actual transfer
is executed. The witness reward is again assigned to the veto
contestant—that is, a wallet posting a VETO transaction—with
the lowest ω signature in the VETO transaction. Similar to the
FINALIZE, the FINALIZE-VETO transaction can be called by
anyone, in particular, the winning veto contestant has monetary
incentive in doing so.
IV. EVALUATION
The approach presented in Section III introduces transac-
tions which change the state of different blockchains within
a blockchain ecosystem, according to given rules. This can
be implemented using smart contracts, e.g., using the Solidity
language [9]—more specifically, the EVM—on the Ethereum
blockchain. We use Solidity to create a reference implemen-
tation of the proposed protocol for evaluation1. However,
other ways of implementing such transactions exist. For in-
stance, instead of using smart contracts (e.g., when dealing
with blockchains without such capabilities), one might add
backwards-compatible layers on top of blockchains, providing
the required capabilities for the transactions presented in this
work. A similar approach is used by OmniLayer [25] or
CounterParty [7, 8], which add such layers for enhanced
features. For this work, however, we use our reference Solidity
implementation of DeXTT for evaluation and cost analysis,
postponing the integration of approaches such as OmniLayer
or CounterParty to future work. Nevertheless, our current
evaluation is sufficient to demonstrate the overall functionality
of the DeXTT protocol using Solidity smart contracts and the
conceptual applicability.
In order to evaluate our approach, we investigate its func-
tionality, performance, and cost impact in an ecosystem of
blockchains with agents performing repeated token transfers.
We achieve these goals by using our reference implementation
consisting of Solidity smart contracts, deploying these smart
contracts on a number of private Ethereum-based blockchains,
and using testing client software to perform transfers with a
given rate.
We ensure a reproducible and uniform ecosystem of
blockchains by using three geth nodes in Proof of Author-
ity (PoA) mode, creating three private blockchains. We choose
PoA to achieve an energy-efficient testing and evaluation plat-
form while being able to perform repeated experiments. Note
that the consensus algorithm, i.e., PoW, Proof of Stake (PoS),
or PoA, defines the behavior of blockchain nodes between
1https://github.com/pantos-io/dextt-prototype
each other and maintains data consistency in the network of
a given blockchain [30]. However, the smart contract layer
is independent of the consensus algorithm. Therefore, our
evaluation on PoA is directly applicable to blockchains with
any consensus algorithm, including PoW.
The geth nodes used in our experiments can be configured,
for instance, with regards to block time and Gas limit. We
observe the behavior of the live Ethereum blockchain (Jan-
uary 2019) and configure our nodes to follow this behavior.
Therefore, our nodes are configured to use a block time of
13 s on average, and a Gas limit of 8 million Ethereum Gas,
mimicking the live Ethereum chain. We use private chains
instead of the Ethereum main chain to enable a high number
and low cost of repeatable experiments in an automated
fashion without depending on external components, such as
Ethereum nodes.
We use 10 clients constantly and simultaneously initiat-
ing transfers within the blockchain ecosystem. This number
is chosen as a balance between feasible and reproducible
experiments and expected real-world conditions. While it is
small compared to evaluations of other classes of distributed
systems, we note that the lack of scalability of blockchain
technologies is a crucial issue in general, and is seen as one of
the main challenges for existing blockchain technologies [15].
We refer to existing literature for a study on how scalability
of blockchains can be improved [23].
In our experimental ecosystem, each client constantly trans-
fers random amounts of PBT to random wallets. If a client
owns too little PBT for a transaction, no transaction is
performed until PBT are available again. After a successful
transfer, the client waits for a random time between 15 s
and 30 s. Afterwards, the process is repeated indefinitely
throughout the entire experiment duration.
We perform two experiment series, as described in the
following sections. The first series is used to evaluate DeXTT
scalability and the impact of the transfer validity period, and
consists of a series of 30-minute experiments, where each
individual experiment uses an increased validity period. The
second series consists of 20 experiments, again with a duration
of 30 min each, used to measure the average cost of a DeXTT
transfer.
A. Scalability and Timing
The DeXTT protocol requires one CLAIM transaction per
transfer, and for each transfer, one FINALIZE transaction per
blockchain. In addition, each contestant posts one CONTEST
transaction to each blockchain. We assume that candidates
which no longer have a chance to win the witness contest (be-
cause a candidate with a lower signature ω for the given
transaction has already posted a CONTEST transaction) do not
post CONTEST transactions to avoid cost. Assuming uniform
distribution of ω values, as defined in Section II-B, on the
average case, each CONTEST transaction halves the space of
remaining possible winning signatures ω (because the expected
value of the uniform distribution is the arithmetic mean of
the domain). Therefore, with each CONTEST transaction, the
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Fig. 1. Impact of Validity Period on Transaction Success
likelihood of another candidate existing with a lower ω is
halved. Following from this, on average, log2 n candidates will
post a CONTEST transaction, where n is the number of total
observers.
Transfer time in the DeXTT protocol is directly impacted
by the transfer validity period [t0, t1] chosen by the sender.
We therefore first evaluate the impact of the validity period.
Using too short validity periods leads to corrupted transfers,
i.e., transfers which cause permanently inconsistent balances,
since observers cannot post CONTEST transactions in time. In
such scenarios, eventual consistency between blockchains is
not guaranteed. As stated above, we use a block time of 13 s,
therefore, we start our experiments with 10 s, and increase
the period by 5 s with each experiment. We then run our
blockchain ecosystem for 30 min using each validity period
and record the number of corrupted transactions. Note that we
have to reset the inconsistent balances for wallets participating
in a corrupted transaction in order to be able to run the
experiments for 30 min.
Figure 1 shows the results of these experiments. Beyond
52 s, no corrupt transactions are observed. It becomes clear
that using the reference implementation and waiting for 4
blocks (52 s) is sufficient for ensuring consistency. Between
1 and 3 blocks (13 s and 39 s, respectively), the amount of
corrupted transactions declines with a varying rate.
From this experiment, we conclude that using a validity
period with the length of at least 4 blocks (52 s) is sufficient
to maintain consistency using our reference implementation.
Additional time may be required in order to accommodate
slow network connectivity.
B. Cost Analysis of DeXTT Transfers
To estimate the cost incurred by DeXTT transfers, we
run the same experiment 20 times. Based on our previous
experiment, we choose 65 s (5 blocks, well above the de-
termined limit of 52 s) as the duration of the PoI validity
period in each transaction. We record the average cost of each
transaction. Table V shows an overview of the cost of the
individual transactions involved in a DeXTT transfer. For each
transaction, we show the mean cost, and its standard deviation,
both in thousands of Ethereum Gas (kGas), and in USD. For
this, we assume a Gas price of 10 Gwei (1 Ether = 109 Gwei
= 1018 wei) and a price of Ether of 115.71 USD. These values
TABLE V
COST ANALYSIS
Cost (kGas) Cost (USD)
Transaction Mean σ Mean σ
CLAIM 57.7 11.1 0.0668 0.0128
CONTEST 81.5 64.2 0.0943 0.0743
FINALIZE 45.5 0.1 0.0527 < 0.0001
VETO 131.3 91.9 0.1520 0.1063
FINALIZE-VETO 48.6 1.7 0.0563 0.0020
were obtained from the Ethereum live chain in January 2019.
Note that our implementation is optimized in that CLAIM
and CONTEST both use the same smart contract function.
Nevertheless, we distinguish the semantic difference (posting
of new transfer for CLAIM, and participating in a contest for
CONTEST) in the results.
In the following, we assume m blockchains and n total
observers. For our calculation, we assume that all observers
monitor all blockchains, and post CONTEST transactions if
it benefits them. A regular DeXTT transfer (i.e., one which
does not contain a conflicting PoI, and therefore requires no
veto) consists of one CLAIM transaction (on the target chain),
log2 n CONTEST transactions (as discussed in Section IV-A)
on each blockchain, i.e., m log2 n CONTEST transactions, and
m FINALIZE transactions. The CLAIM transaction is posted by
the receiver, and each CONTEST transactions is posted by an
observer (thus becoming a contestant). While the FINALIZE
transaction can be posted by any party, posting it is beneficial
to the receiver (because it finalizes the transfer to the receiver),
and therefore it can be expected that the receiver will bear its
cost to finalize the transfer.
The expected cost in kGas for a DeXTT transfer are as
follows: The receiver bears the cost for one CLAIM transac-
tion (57.7 kGas) and m FINALIZE transactions (45.5 kGas
each). Each of the log2 n expected observers posting transac-
tions bears the cost for m CONTEST transactions (81.5 kGas
each). The sender does not bear any cost.
Assuming a blockchain ecosystem of 10 blockchains, the
total transaction cost for the receiver is 0.59 USD. Each
of the log2 n observers posting transactions bears cost of
0.94 USD. These numbers represent our current reference
implementation and can be regarded as an upper bound for
DeXTT transfer cost. Any additional optimization to the smart
contract code has the potential to further reduce the Gas cost
of the individual transactions, and therefore, of the overall
DeXTT transfer.
Additionally, these numbers allow us to reason about the
economic impact of a currency using DeXTT transactions.
Observers pay transaction cost of 0.94 USD, and potentially
receive a witness reward, currently defined as 1 PBT. The
chance of an observer winning is 1n , however, according to
the discussion in Section IV-A on average, only log2 n out of
all n observers are expected to post CONTEST transactions.
Therefore, the likelihood for an observer posting a transaction
to win the contest is log2 nn .
Therefore, the investment for each observer is 0.94 USD,
the contest reward is 1 PBT, and the winning likelihood is
log2 n
n . From this, it follows that in order for the observer to
have incentive to post CONTEST transactions in an ecosystem
of m = 10 blockchains, the inequation shown in (14) must
hold, where p is the price of PBT in USD.
log2 n
n
p > 0.94 [USD] (14)
In other words, the price of PBT in USD divided by the
number of observers must be higher than 0.94. Assuming
n = 10 observers, the PBT price must be above 2.83 USD.
Assuming n = 100, the PBT price must be above 14.15 USD.
For n = 1000, the PBT price must be above 94.32 USD.
Note that these number assume m = 10 blockchains, and a
fixed reward of 1 PBT. A pro rata reward, e.g., 1% of the
transferred PBT, would reduce the required PBT price but
increase the complexity of calculating the witness incentive.
Furthermore, a dynamic reward adaption based on the number
of observers, similar to the variable mining rewards in Bitcoin,
or a value selected by the sender, similar to the Gas price in
Ethereum, can also be used to reduce the required PBT price,
and therefore incentivize observers. We note again that these
numbers pose an upper boundary for the expected DeXTT
transfer cost and PBT price requirements for witness incentive.
V. RELATED WORK
As discussed in Section I, cross-blockchain interoperability
can be used to address the fragmentation of the blockchain
research field. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, contempo-
rary approaches provide only limited interoperability across
blockchains.
Initial interoperability was limited to trading assets on
centralized exchanges. Subsequently, decentralized exchanges
such as Bisq [1] or 0x [24] emerged. Most recently, the
Republic protocol [29] has been proposed, which includes
a decentralized dark pool exchange, i.e., details about an
exchange are kept secret.
All of these approaches, however, are concerned with the
exchange of assets, generally using atomic swaps [14] for
trustless asset exchange. In such an atomic swap, one party
might transfer, e.g., Bitcoin to another party, while the other
party transfers, e.g., Ether to the first. In such an atomic
swap, each asset remains on its blockchain. In contrast, we
propose a protocol for trading assets independently of a
specific blockchains. In our approach, the balance information
for such assets is stored on all blockchains simultaneously.
Another approach for a multi-blockchain framework is
presented in PolkaDot [27]. PolkaDot aims to provide “the
bedrock relay-chain” upon which data structures can be hosted.
However, in contrast to our approach, no specifics about cross-
blockchain asset transfers are provided. Instead, PolkaDot
is explicitly not designed to be used as a currency [27].
Furthermore, PolkaDot is meant to be used as a basis for future
blockchains (and other decentralized data structures), while
in our current approach, we aim to use existing blockchains
and implement functionality on top of them. However, the
concepts presented in the PolkaDot paper are complementary
to techniques we used in our approach.
Decentralized cross-blockchain transfers allow users to fully
utilize the existing variety of blockchains, instead of being
locked to a single blockchain. To the best of our knowledge,
the approach closest to the work at hand is Metronome [20],
which uses assets available on multiple blockchains. However,
Metronome proposes that assets still lie on one specific
blockchain at a time, while in our proposal, the assets are
not bound to one blockchain.
The DeXTT protocol presented in this paper is based on
our own former work. The XPP has been formally described
in [4]. Furthermore, in [5], we describe the deterministic
witness selection approach conceptually. The work at hand
significantly extends our former work by providing a concrete
implementation of this approach within the DeXTT protocol.
Furthermore, the work at hand is a significant enhancement of
our earlier work, in which we also defined a token existing
across blockchains. However, each wallet had a different
balance on each blockchain (and all balances were recorded
on all blockchains) [4]. In the work at hand, this concept
is simplified, yielding only one balance per wallet (which is
recorded on all blockchains).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented DeXTT, a protocol for
transferring cross-blockchain tokens, existing on a single
blockchain, but tradeable on multiple blockchains. This re-
duces dependency on a single blockchain and risk, e.g., of
selecting a blockchain which later suffers from a security
breach. DeXTT ensures eventual consistency of balances
across blockchains, and prohibits double spending. We have
presented the protocol in detail, implemented it in Solidity,
and provided an experimental evaluation, highlighting its per-
formance with regards to time and cost.
Our evaluation shows that the reference implementation of
DeXTT requires at least 4 blocks for maintaining consistent
balances. Furthermore, we show that a DeXTT transfer us-
ing our reference implementation costs 103.2 kGas for the
receiver, and 81.5 kGas for any contributing observer. We also
provide an analysis of the economic impact of the witness
rewards based on the parameters of the multi-blockchain
ecosystem used.
In future work, we will address the main limitation of our
current evaluation by implementing DeXTT using additional
technologies such as OmniLayer or CounterParty and therefore
evaluate the performance of DeXTT in a blockchain ecosystem
consisting of mixed blockchain types. Furthermore, we aim to
implement DeXTT on other native smart contract platforms
such as EOS.IO [10]. In addition, we aim to evaluate more
refined approaches for the veto contest, which can be used to
relax the currently strict requirement of not signing to outgoing
PoIs with overlapping validity periods.
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